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Introduction
Central America has been directly affected by the
crisis of US hegemony on a world scale and the global
economic crisis. The latter has exacerbated many
existing regional problems; for example, rocketing
interest rates have had serious impacts on debt
payments, and the decline of markets for the area's
raw materials has coincided with a rise in protectionist
policies in the industrialised West. The result has been
to limit the export of industrial goods from Central
America on the one hand and to contract investment
surpluses, especially in open economies, on the other.
Externally, Central America has been defined by the
Reagan administration as an arena for recouping US
global supremacy through military confrontation and
victory. This, in turn, is used to justify the rise in
military expenditures and the interventionist behaviour
which characterises Washington's New Cold War
policy. This article presents a comparative analysis of
the United States and Canadian economic interests
and state policies with respect to Central America. For
the purposes of this article, Central America refers to
El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua.
United States and Central America:
the economic dimension
Although the internal politics of the Central American
region have been fraught with instability, diverse
sectors of US capital have had no difficulty adjusting
their interests over time. While the types, scope and
direction of capital flows have varied - beginning
with direct investment in agriculture and mining,
followed by manufacturing, financial loan capital,
state and international bank capital - there has been
no significant rupture or division among them
regarding US policy, or their relations with dictatorial
regimes.
During the post-World War I period, the United
States displaced Britain as the dominant economic
power in Central America. Between 1919 and 1929,
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American investment more than doubled to $251 mn
and was located in every important sector of the
Central American economies including railroads,
banking, public utilities, industries, mining, and
banana and rubber plantations. From the Great
Depression to the Alliance for Progress, the pattern of
metropolitan capital flows served to consolidate and
deepen the monoculture economy and dependence on
agricultural export. Between 1950 and 1959, for
instance, almost $100 mn in new US investments went
into the region, mostly into public utilities, minerals,
agro-exports, and the highly profitable food and raw
material producing sectors [LaFeber 1983:60-2, 127-
8]. While the tripling of US direct investments between
1960 and 1980 was paralleled by an increasing
concentration of new capital in manufacturing activity
(from $12 mn to $147 mn), the diminished proportion
of new investments in agriculture and mining
enterprise did not imply the erosion of the
monoculture export-oriented economy [US Depart-
ment of Commerce 1981:31-2, 1982:1-27, 1983:23-4].
Central America still remained a cluster of largely
agricultural based economies dominated by American
multinationals.
Financial capital, and more particularly the largest US
multinational banks, such as the Bank of America,
Citicorp, and Chase Manhattan, began to play an
increasingly important role in Central America during
the 1970s as governments sought to cope with the twin
problems of spiralling oil import costs and declining
export markets. Between 1970 and 1981 total gross
inflows of medium and long-term loans increased
from $118 mn to $978 mn and finance capital assumed
a commanding role in the region [World Bank
1983:176]. The accelerated dependence on external
sources of financing was accompanied by a massive
growth in the external debt over the same period from
$439 mn to over $4.5 bn [World Bank 1983:178]. By
1981, US private banks had $3.3 bn in loans
outstanding to the Central American public and
private sectors [Barry et al 1983:9].
At the level of the US state, the dictatorships of
Central America have been the recipients of a vast
programme of bilateral and multilateral aid since the
Alliance for Progress. Between 1962 and 1978,
Washington and the 'international' banks (i.e. World
Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank)
provided the ruling classes in the region with over
$900 mn and almost $1.5 bn in economic assistance
respectively [US Agency for International Develop-
ment 1982:47-8, 51-2, 54, 202-5]. The rise in US
government financial aid to the right-wing military
and military controlled regimes in El Salvador,
Honduras and Guatemala since Reagan took office
has been striking, even when compared with the last
two years of the Carter presidency when these regimes
benefitted economically from a shift in Washington's
regional policy. During 1979 and 1980, Honduras and
Guatemala received a combined total of$l09.7 mn in
US economic assistance; over the three-year period
198 1-83, the figure rose to $347 mn. In the case of El
Salvador, the Reagan government channeled economic
aid at an even greater rate: $523 mn between 1981 and
1983 compared with $60.7 mn in 1979-80 [Weisman
1983:1,11; Smith 1984:4].
In seeking to mobilise support for its political
objectives in Central America within the 'international'
banks, the Reagan administration has pursued a two-
pronged strategy:
- maximum pressure to secure passage of loan
requests by 'friendly' governments in El Salvador and
Guatemala;
- sustained opposition to all development aid for
Nicaragua whose government it defines as hostile to
US politico-economic interests in the region.
The second objective has achieved considerable
success, especially in the Inter-American Development
Bank where the US exercises a veto power over the
Bank's 'soft loan window'. Between January 1982 and
1983, the US representative cast negative, votes on
seven loan requests by Nicaragua involving a total of
$84.4 mn [Latin American Regional Reports 1984:2].
Essentially the process of incorporating new US
capital with old has been an additive-accommodative
relation. The absence of any rupture between the
various forms of capital reflects the complementary
role they perform, the interlocking interests they
share, and their narrow socio-political bases of
support in the region which requires strategic alliances
with local repressive elites and dependence on the US
state.
United States and Central America:
the military dimension
One of the striking features of long-term US policy
toward Central America is the continuity between
different administrations. From a regional perspective,
it has made little difference over time whether there
have been Democrats or Republicans, liberals or
conservatives, in the White House. US policy-makers
(with brief exceptional interludes) have relied on their
military options and alliances with the area's armed
forces to maintain Central America within Wash-
ington's orbit. This continuity in policy reflects the
shared strategic position of both Republicans and
Democrats that US domination of the region is an
unalterable reality.
Since the 1950s, the United States has played a
paramount role in financing, training and equipping
the armed forces and police constabularies of Central
America. These coercive forces have, in turn, acted as
powerful institutional collaborators in the pursuit of
US goals for the region. During the Alliance for
Progress, Washington's military aid programme grew
significantly as part of Kennedy's determination to
prevent 'another Cuba' in the hemisphere. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, large-scale US military
assistance provided much of the hardware for the
brutal counterinsurgency 'pacification' campaign in
rural Guatemala carried out by the armed forces. The
Somoza National Guard in Nicaragua, a 'creature' of
the US from its inception to its demise, received
millions of dollars worth of American weapons from
the Ford and Carter administrations between 1975
and 1978.
In the contemporary conjuncture there is an
additional factor which has reinforced or 'over-
determined' the growing US imperial presence in the
region: the need of the Reagan administration to
achieve a military victory in order to justify the vast
armaments programme that is the core of the new
Cold War. El Salvador, in particular, has become the
theatre in which Reagan hopes to demonstrate that
force, not negotiation, 'works' - thus intertwining
regional with global politics. Authorised US military
aid increased from $5.9 mn in 1979-80 to almost
$200 mn between January 1981 and December 1983
[Weisman 1983:1,11; US Agency for International
Development 1982:47]. The other major US military
buildup has taken place in Honduras where the
Pentagon has created 'a substantial semi-permanent
military capability' [Hiatt and Omang 1984:A81 and
used the country as a site of large and continuing
military manoeuvres since Reagan took office.
Complementing Honduras's interlocking military
relations with the US is its role as a launching base for
the Washington financed and trained counter-
revolutionary forces seeking to overthrow the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
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Under Reagan the basic logic of US policy in Central
America has outrun immediate economic interests.
The logic of war has replaced economic logic to the
degree that Washington now links its global policy to a
successful military resolution of the regional conflict.
At the same time, the strategic military emphasis,
while divorced from immediate economic interests,
must be placed within the specific historical context of
a larger effort to reconstitute the ideology of
imperialism and the imperial state in the post-Vietnam
era. Washington views the buildup of military power
in Central America as the critical element in recreating
economic opportunities on a world scale. El Salvador
has been defined as the favoured country in which to
reassert US power, to gain a military victory which
would not only legitimise the Reagan administration's
regional policy but also the whole thrust of its new
Cold War definition of politics on a regional and
international scale.
US Policy and Capitalist Class
Interests in Central America
Historically, US capitalist interests operating in
Central America have worked closely with the US
state and its repressive 'client' states. In periods of
crisis, particularly during those moments when the
imperial state has lost the capacity to impose its will,
capitalist interests develop a variety of positions
relative to the regime in question - from outright
opposition to accommodation. The clearest case in
point has been the accommodating style of behaviour
displayed by the private banks and the multinationals
operating in Nicaragua; a position which contrasts
with the confrontationist posture adopted by the
Reagan administration.
There remains a widely held belief among the US
corporate and banking community with holdings or
financial exposure in Nicaragua (unlike US policy-
makers) that the Sandinista regime is a permanent
fixture and that if the private sector is not abolished
'economic realities' will ultimately lead to an economy
that is less statist. Many companies, especially those
with large fixed investments, have endeavoured to
'ride out' internal changes and adapt to the new
operating environment. Delays in obtaining foreign
exchange for raw material imports, etc. have been
offset by the 'pragmatic' behaviour of Ministry of
Economy officials and the absence of any serious
conflicts between labour and capital. However, even
profitable existing investments have not generated
significant new US investments on the grounds that
the political-economic direction of the regime has not
been sufficiently clarified.
US bankers also tend to characterise Nicaragua's
approach to its inherited financial problems as
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'pragmatic', despite their refusal to provide virtually
any new bank loans since 1979. The bankers'
accommodating stance was most strikingly illustrated
in the debt renegotiation meetings between Sandinista
officials and the country's major financial creditors. In
October 1980, an agreement was reached to reschedule
$600 mn (approximately 80 per cent owed to US
banks) of Nicaragua's total $1.6 bn debt over a two
year period. The development of a consensus within
the banks' negotiating committee which produced this
result grew out of their shifting perceptions of the
Sandinista regime's authority and intentions during
the course of negotiations. It gradually became clear
to these financiers that Managua was determined to
negotiate a settlement; that it was prepared to deal
pragmatically with the bankers and consider con-
cessions in pursuit of an agreement; and that the
Sandinistas were firmly in control of political and state
power and, therefore, in a position to make necessary
concessions.
The efforts of the Reagan administration to overthrow
the Sandinista government continue to be viewed
cautiously by many US companies and banks
operating in Nicaragua. Moreover, executives of a
number of US-based multinationals interviewed in
mid-1983 even went so far as to interpret the
administration's military and economic pressures as
counterproductive to the interests of foreign capital.
Some also voiced displeasure over what they felt was
another negative consequence of Washington's policy:
increased, commercial relations between Nicaragua
and capitalist, as well as socialist, bloc countries at the
expense of US traders [Gilpin 1983:D7].
The two faces of imperialism, business collaboration
and opposition and the military confrontationist
position, reflect not only different estimates of the
durability of the Sandinista regime but also different
sets of strategic priorities. For Washington the
regional conflict is embedded in a global strategy and
thus the ideological and symbolic meaning of
'defeating Marxism' becomes paramount. For the
bankers and multinationals the strategic issue is
preventing the repudiation of the debt and the
disintegration of the private sector.
Thus the historical convergence of a policy between
the state and capital is not incompatible with the
appearance of divergences in a particular conjucture.
Investment capital's flexibility is indicative of the
belief that the imperatives of underdevelopment force
revolutionaries to come to terms with it. The prudent
counter-revolutionary policy adopted by business
reflects the desire to support the destabilisation of the
regime provided there are good chances that it will
succeed. On the other hand, it is opposed to hardline
policies if they provide few prospects for success since
the eventual outcome would be to radicalise the
regime. Thus the divergences between capital and the
state reflect a pragmatic or opportunist position on the
part of capital which, however, may succumb to a state
with strong ideological-strategic concerns - a
consequence which is apparently unfolding in
Nicaragua.
Canada and Central America:
the economic dimension
The Canadian state and capital does not have the
long-term deep structural ties with the Central
American ruling classes that their US counterparts
developed and cultivated. Canada's linkages are
primarily commercial, relatively recent and largely
independent of client-state patronage. The nature of
the Canadian commitment is essential to an
understanding of the Canadian government's capacity
to disassociate itself from the most heinous regimes or
policies in the region. The economic trade, as opposed
to the political-military, emphasis in Canada's
relations with Central America, explains why it is
possible for Ottawa to diverge from Washington's
policy when the latter attempts to impose an economic
blockade on a regime such as Nicaragua. Similarly,
Canada is less likely to diverge from the US when it
involves limiting its trade with a human rights violator
(e.g. Guatemala) which is allied with the US. Trading
with revolutionary states and US clients thus reflects
the commercial influences that shape Canadian
foreign policy in the region.
While the Canadian investment and financial presence
in Central America has grown steadily over the last
decade and a half, under the Trudeau government the
role of trade assumed even greater importance.
Ottawa's 'third option' strategy to break Canada's
trade dependence on the United States has been
facilitated by the setting up of two state agencies: the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
which administers the government's bilateral aid
programme for the hemisphere; and an Export
Development Corporation (EDC) which provides
subsidies and other supports for Canadian traders.
Although thelargest trade gains during the 1970s were
recorded in Latin America and the Commonwealth
Caribbean, the value of Canadian exports to Central
America still more than quadrupled from $25.7 mn in
1970 to $140.3 mn in 1980 [Business Latin America, 5
January 1983; Murray 1981-82:119-20].
The other side of Canadian policy is its accom-
modation to US policy in the region, reflecting the
opposition of Canadian capital to social revolution
and the recognition that the US imperial state provides
an 'umbrella' under which it can effectively operate.
The duality of Canadian policy thus moves between
the parameters of US hegemony and Central
American revolution - one side threatens displace-
ment, the other threatens expropriation. Canadian
capital, as capital of a 'follower nation', seeks to limit
intervention without facilitating revolution, carving
out political and economic space for itself.
The Trudeau government's bilateral aid programme
in Central America and Canada's voting behaviour
within the 'international' banks during the late Carter
and Reagan administrations mirrored some of the
contradictory qualities of official policy statements:
instances of collaboration with Washington's
objectives were interspaced with decisions that reflect
an independent policy position. Honduras, for
example, although a centre of US military activity in
Central America and a base for counter-revolutionary
operations against Nicaragua, has been designated a
'country focus' by CIDA. Bilateral assistance for the
three-year period 1980-83 totalled $43.7 mn and,
according to Canadian officials, this figure could
almost double over the next five years [Canadian
International Development Agency 1983]. Meanwhile,
Ottawa maintains an ongoing economic relationship
with the Sandinista regime, extending millions of
dollars in lines of credit to Managua, while trying
simultaneously to accommodate the twin goals of
promoting trade and maintaining aid at a level that
would not unduly antagonise Washington.
Between 1980 and 1982, the Canadian executive
director in the Inter-American Development Bank
(BID) abstained on three loan requests by El Salvador
totalling over $90 mn but also voted with Washington
to approve a $79 mn dam project loan. Similarly, in
the International Monetary Fund, Canada supported
a $39 mn Salvadoran loan, ultimately approved under
enormous US pressure despite its failure to meet the
normal lender requirements of the IMF, only to turn
around and oppose a subsequent $129 mn standby
loan to the regime in El Salvador [McDowell 1983:15;
Morrell and Biddle 1983:4].
The sharpest area of disagreement between the US and
Canada in the 'international' banks revolves around
the question of economic assistance to Nicaragua -
especially in the BID where US policy has been
opposed by a majority of the membership, including
Canada. One of the more notable clashes concerned a
$2.2 mn Nicaraguan loan disbursal request in June
1983 to complete a road building project. Every
member country except the US supported the loan
which the American representative subsequently
vetoed on 'macroeconomic' grounds. At the June
meeting of the board of BID, Canadian executive
director Henry Hodder argued that there was no
economic basis for rejecting the proposal and
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pointedly noted that the bank staff had found the loan
perfectly acceptable [Rossiter 1984:4].
The Canadian Government and
Central America: divergence and
accommodation with US policy
Canadian policy toward Central America under the
Trudeau government was a contradictory mix of
public criticism of US actions and official and
practical cooperation, reflecting a determination on
Ottawa's part not to allow differences over this issue to
provoke a fundamental rupture between the two
countries.
The public statements of Canadian policy-makers
were often at sharp variance with Washington's
policy:
- the origins of the crisis are ascribed to internal
economic and social factors rather than Soviet-Cuban
subversion;
- a cluster of ideologically diverse regimes is
preferred to a region dominated by repressive
capitalist regimes;
- political negotiations, not the militarisation of
civil society, is viewed from Ottawa as the only
realistic solution to the conflict.
Trudeau addressed the issue of US-Canadian
differences over Central America at a press conference
in April 1983: 'There are major divergences, beginning
with the fact that we object to the interference in the
internal affairs of other countries by any major power,
even if that power is our friend. We certainly saidthat
to the [United] States before . . .' [Gray 1983:1]. The
following August, in meetings with senior officials
responsible for Latin American policy within the
Reagan administration, the Canadian Ambassador to
the United States, Allan Gotlieb, expressed Ottawa's
concern over US military escalation in the region and
reiterated his government's preference for a 'political
approach' to the Nicaraguan problem [Valpy 1983:6].
However, the Trudeau government's differences with
Washington over Central America were conveyed
primarily through 'quiet diplomacy', and coexisted
with instances of both public and private alignment
with Reagan policy. Throughout 1982 and 1983, for
instance, Canadian statements critical of the 'escalating
military confrontation' in Central America were
accompanied by declarations of support for the US
military buildup in El Salvador which officials
justified by ascribing legitimacy to the existing
government and exhibiting concern over guerrilla
gains.
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In June 1983, Trudeau told the Canadian House of
Commons that he saw no reason for the US to end its
military activities in the region as long as other
external forces were similarly involved [Toronto Globe
and Mail, 9 June 1983]. This tacit acknowledgement of
Washington's contention that Central America is an
arena for the 'testing of wills' between the US and
Soviet Union was again demonstrated when he
declared before parliament 'that what the United
States does in Latin America is its own business
because the Spanish-speaking world is one of its
spheres of influence' [Riley 1983:22].
Thus, Canadian policy toward Central America under
Trudeau has evolved indepedently of the United States
to a limited degree. This independence is reflected in
Ottawa's refusal to lend its support to military
adventures, in its consistent support of a political
solution to the regional crisis, in its more eclectic
choice of economic partners (e.g. Guatemala and
Nicaragua), and in its refusal to side with Washington
in opposing 'international' bank loans to the
Sandinista regime. At the same time, there has been a
gradual shift towards conceding the primacy of US
interest in the region and a parallel growth in official
Canadian criticism of the 'authoritarian' tendencies of
the Nicaraguan government and the guerrilla
movement in El Salvador. This convergence with US
policy, shaped by an overriding concern not to let
Central America become the occasion for a major rift
in bilateral relations, has not, however, had any
demonstrable impact on the basic thrust of Reagan
policy. Ineffectual support in some areas coexists with
ineffectual opposition in others. Although Canada
remains critical of the US emphasis on military
solutions in Central America, both countries share a
common global purpose, and ultimately Canada
depends on the 'umbrella' provided by the US
'imperial system' of which they are both a part.
While Canadian policy toward Central America has
displayed a relative autonomy from the United States,
the Trudeau government's behaviour nonetheless
suggests that the capacity or willingness of the
Canadians to develop a consequential position
differing from that of Washington is sharply limited.
The basic constraints on Canadian actions, which
account for practical accommodations with White
House policy, are several. First and foremost are the
bilateral relations between Canada and the US which
constitute the prime foreign economic ties for Canada.
Second, there is the preponderant dependence of
Canadian capital on the US state to counter
revolutionary developments in the area. Third are the
shared interests and activities of US subsidiaries based
in Canada which operate in Central America and US
mulinationals. Fourth, there are the joint banking
efforts and consortia that divide up the loan and
interest market in the region.
Within these constraints, however, divergences in the
trade sphere persist. Canada has developed an
increasingly important stake in overseas trade: it is
interested in breaking into new markets independently
of the ideological texture of the regime. In Central
America, not only do politically tied or client
governments closely linked with US corporate
interests provide limited opportunities for such
expansion, but the political conflicts engendered by
overt US military intrusions also conflict with the
essentially market oriented policies of the Canadian
government. At the same time, these trade policies
allow Canadian exporters to displace their American
counterparts when, for political reasons, the latter
abandon markets. The relatively greater importance
of market concerns and non-dependence on 'client'
political regimes allows Ottawa to adopt a more
liberal and flexible approach within the parameters of
its ties with the US. However, as Washington deepens
its commitments to a military confrontation,
allocating more and more resources and manpower,
the likelihood is that Canadian policy will become less
directly conflictual with the United States, by hiding
behind the commonplace rhetoric of accommodation
to Great Power hegemony in the region.
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